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Abstract 
 
ew economic geography theories predict that historically densely 
settled areas also become more industrialised. Industrial 
agglomeration has therefore cultivated spatial inequalities in all parts of 
the world. South Africa presents an interesting case study, where 
institutional failures interrupted the ‘usual’ agglomeration process. On 
the one hand, current day metropolitan regions are located in 
historically densely populated areas. On the other hand, apartheid-era 
homelands also had highly concentrated populations, but did not 
industrialise to the same extent as other parts of South Africa. Much 
earlier in history, following the mfecane, these locations attracted 
migrants in search of favourable agricultural conditions and physical 
security in the face of conflict (they were high rainfall, rugged areas). 
The benefit of settling in these areas, however, only remained prior to 
imposed restrictions on land ownership (1913 Land Act) and movement 
of people (during apartheid). This paper decomposes modern spatial 
inequality, and establishes that agglomerations and historical 
institutional failures explain large proportions of spatial inequality. 
Furthermore, the homelands wage penalty reverses once these 
controls are introduced into various models: had agglomeration taken 
its course without institutional constraints, the homelands would likely 
have developed into high paying local economies. While new economic 
geography theories hold in the urban core, the densely populated 
former homelands did not follow this trajectory. Spatial inequality is 
therefore more severe than it would have been had institutional failures 
not prevented the former homelands from industrialising at the same 
pace as other historically densely populated areas. 
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1 Introduction 
 
African inequality has not abated significantly from the high levels that arose at the 
time of colonisation (Bigsten, 2016); in particular, inter-regional inequality has 
remained persistently high, despite predictions of the famous Kuznets (1955) 
hypothesis in the opposite direction. The foundation of his theory rests on narrowing 
spatial inequalities as countries pass a critical developmental threshold (Kanbur, 
2017). Alternative explanations are therefore required to understand the slow 
movement in overall and spatial inequality. Institutions – whether political or 
informal – can explain the persistence of overall inequality; democratisation 
provided the context for reductions in inequality in many currently developed 
countries (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2002; Lakner & Milanovic, 2016; Lindert, 2000) 
and in other contexts elites continue to protect the status quo to maintain their 
economic advantages (Sokoloff & Engerman, 2000; Fourie & von Fintel, 2012; 
Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). However, none of these “broadly defined” institutions 
explain why spatial inequality might persist. 
 
New economic geographers provide a lens through which to understand why spatial 
inequality can persist or propagate (Krugman, 1991; Krugell, 2014). The primary 
reason is the presence of agglomeration forces. If transport costs are high enough (to 
discourage long distance movement of goods from production plants to consumers), 
and if economies-of-scale are present in an industry, firms tend to concentrate in 
regions close to potential markets (or where populations are already densely settled). 
New firms perpetuate and intensify this pattern, as they attempt to benefit from 
external economies-of-scale: that is, they prefer to locate close to existing firms to 
benefit from knowledge spill-overs and to break into existing markets (instead of 
creating new ones). Existing geographic distributions of industry continue. These 
factors explain why spatial inequality persists and even grows. ‘Initial’ pre-industrial 
settlement patterns therefore matter for the geographic distribution of modern 
economic activity, but only because it makes sense for new firms to follow their 
predecessors – even if the contexts and reasons for choosing their locations are no 
longer relevant in later periods.  
 
This paper considers the case of South Africa, where spatial inequalities are severe 
and historically entrenched. I show that a large part of spatial earnings inequality can 
be explained by current labour market conditions (labour demand and worker 
bargaining power), which are steeped in agglomeration around historically densely 
populated areas. Labour market conditions are most favourable in current-day 
metropoles: these regions were also more densely populated than most of the country 
before industrialisation, and arose around port cities and areas with valuable mineral 
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deposits. The extraction of minerals is one of the factors that has influenced overall 
inequality in South Africa (Wilson, 2011). Despite South Africa’s declining reliance 
on the primary sector, secondary and tertiary industries continued to develop in these 
urban pockets to form the industrial core of South Africa. Up to this point, it appears 
as if South Africa’s trajectory conforms to the theories of new economic geography 
and may therefore suffice to understand modern spatial inequality.  
 
However, separate development also segmented labour and product markets across 
space. As was the case with current-day metropolitan areas, the former apartheid 
homelands were also historically densely populated prior to industrialisation. 
Populations have remained densely concentrated in these regions as a result of 
limitations on black African migration; however, these same regions have 
experienced extreme poverty and slow industrialisation, defying the predictions of 
new economic geography. Apartheid government-led attempts at decentralised 
industrialisation close to the borders of these regions failed. Historically these areas 
were densely settled by black Africans, and European colonisers did not sufficiently 
invest in infrastructure to connect these areas to the industrial core. For instance, the 
massive expansion of Cape Colony railways between about 1900 and 1906 continued 
to bypass what would later become the homelands (Herranz-Loncán & Fourie, 2018). 
Under-investment in homelands infrastructure continued into the apartheid era. 
Coupled with political uncertainty, this limited the success of decentralised border 
industries (Lowenberg, 1997). In essence, agglomeration did not occur in these 
densely populated areas, because of institutional failures that were propagated by the 
apartheid regime and its predecessors.  
 
I argue that geographically defined separate development prevented agglomeration, 
which would otherwise have taken root in the former apartheid homelands. Lagging 
industrialisation in these regions persists despite high historical and current 
population density. Firms still do not primarily locate close to these areas, despite 
potentially high market demand from large settlements. Instead, formal sector firms 
continue to locate primarily in regions where they benefit from the physical and 
knowledge infrastructure that supports the existing urban core of the economy. This 
particular anomaly to new economic geography theories can only be explained by 
the institutions that were determined by a geographically targeted policy – namely 
separate development.  
 
Empirical estimates show that historical initial conditions play a similar role to 
current labour market conditions in explaining regional earnings imbalances. Hence, 
both agglomeration that emerged in metropoles, and historical patterns and 
institutions that limited agglomeration in homelands, explain the extent of spatial 
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inequality in South Africa.  I hypothesise that spatial inequality would not have been 
absent if separate development had not occurred – agglomeration forces would have 
created a core and periphery as in most countries.  Spatial inequality would, however, 
have been lower had separate development not taken its course: welfare differences 
between former homelands and current metropolitan areas would have been 
narrower, as the latter would have attracted more firms. This paper therefore argues 
that while usual market interactions can lead to spatial inequality, institutional 
failures can potentially exacerbate the channels proposed by new economic 
geographers.    
 
This paper decomposes South African spatial earnings inequality in the first decade 
of the 2000s. The analysis identifies the relative contributions of modern and 
historical conditions on inter-regional spatial inequality. In particular, I focus on 
early 20th century settlement patterns in relation to geography and historical climate 
shocks; subsequently, segregation reinforced the spatial distribution of people on the 
periphery of the economy, while the structure and spatial pattern of the economy 
changed to benefit an urban core. Kuznetsian thought would predict that the 
commencement of freedom of movement in the 1980s should have progressively 
alleviated large spatial welfare differences. However, apartheid-era spatial 
differences continue to be replicated (von Fintel & Moses, 2017; Burger et al., 2017). 
New agglomeration did not occur close to the densely populated homelands in the 
democratic era. This is because external economies of scale that result from locating 
close to existing firms remain absent in accordance with the historical pattern. 
 
I use geographically weighted regressions (Fotheringham, Brunsdon, & Charlton, 
2002) to find ‘local’ estimates of mean log earnings, conditional on the factors which 
I intend to isolate in the various decompositions. Results show that homelands 
regions still experience a large wage penalty relative to the rest of the country. This 
phenomenon can, however, be explained by high local unemployment and 
unionisation rates, as well as historical patterns of settlement and climate shocks. 
Had these proxies for agglomeration (or lack thereof) been equalised across space, 
the apartheid homelands would likely have been high-paying regions today. The 
variance decomposition allows me to estimate reductions in spatial earnings 
inequality that would likely occur should the constraints of the past be removed in a 
counterfactual world. I argue that one part of the homeland penalty results from 
settlement patterns that occurred before the unification of South Africa in 1910: while 
these conditions were favourable for welfare at that time, this is no longer the case in 
the 2000s. Migration limitations imposed by the apartheid government prevented 
people from moving at the time that these same conditions became less favourable 
for economic success. In the context of structural evolution, whereby the economy 
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moved from primary to secondary and tertiary production, the existing spatial 
population pattern locked people into rural areas that were becoming increasingly 
isolated from core economic activity. The persistence of this effect is also associated 
to low labour demand that has remained statically low, even after democratisation 
and the liberalisation of internal migration. This concords with new economic 
geography theory: new firms locate where other firms are already established. 
Though former political institutions are abandoned, their legacy remains manifest 
through permanent changes in local labour demand. In turn, spatial inequality 
continues to follow historical patterns.  
 
2 Spatial inequality in South Africa 
 
Spatial inequality is one of the defining features of overall inequality in South Africa, 
and remains strongly correlated with race (Burger et al., 2017). A string of 
discriminatory legislation that followed the unification of South Africa under British 
rule in 1910 laid the foundations for these strong and persistent regional differences. 
Most famously, the Land Act of 1913 limited acquisition of land by the black African 
majority to an area that comprises only 7% of South Africa’s surface; this was later 
expanded to 13.5% by the 1936 Land Act. These areas were then converted to 
apartheid-era homelands – some with self-governing status – which were to form the 
pillars of so-called “separate development”. Black Africans were not regarded as 
citizens of South Africa, but of homelands. Between the 1960s and 1980s, 
approximately 3.5 million individuals were forcibly relocated to live in these densely 
populated regions (Abel, 2016). In 1950, the Group Areas Act reinforced this 
segregation. Black African individuals were not allowed free access to live and work 
in (white) urban areas, and influx controls were introduced. Predominantly men 
followed a circular migration pattern between permanent households in the 
homelands and temporary homes in urban areas where they found jobs.  
 
Former homelands regions continue to face the highest levels of unemployment in 
the country (von Fintel, 2017). Standard theory predicts that under conditions of free 
movement, migration should take place and partially equalise wage and employment 
imbalances across regions (Harris & Todaro, 1970). Unemployment also remains 
high in urban centres, however, yet lower than in former homelands, so that the 
probability of obtaining a job after migration remains poor. Therefore, despite large 
migration flows since the abolition of influx controls in 1986, unemployment has 
also not shifted to urban areas to equalise across space (von Fintel & Moses, 2017). 
Mudiriza (2018) provides first estimates of regional wage convergence for South 
Africa: using post-apartheid census data, he estimates that it would take 19 years to 
halve the regional wage gap in South Africa. Convergence across regions therefore 
 
86 J.STUD.ECON.ECONOMETRICS, 2018, 42(2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
remains slow, and local labour markets are likely to remain segregated (into low 
paying, high unemployment rural areas and higher paying, lower unemployment 
urban areas) in line with existing patterns of spatial inequality. Once controlling for 
structural hindrances such as local human capital, local unemployment and homeland 
status, however, this figure drops to only 5 years. Consequently, the former 
homelands is one notable anomaly that consistently lags behind the rest of the 
country and slows down convergence across space.  
 
The apartheid homelands are rooted in historical political institutions and continue 
to have a strong bearing on maintaining spatial inequality. In the early 2000s the 
former homelands regions – which continue to be dominantly settled by black 
Africans – still lagged behind the rest of South Africa in terms of other basic welfare 
indicators, such as self-reported hunger. The expansion of cash transfers towards 
these regions has, however, gradually narrowed the spatial gap in food adequacy 
(Pienaar & von Fintel, 2014). A substantial homelands earnings penalty exists 
(Kingdon & Knight, 2006). Accounting for high local unemployment rates overturns 
this result, yielding what would have been a wage premium had labour demand been 
more robust. Kingdon and Knight (2006) argue that institutionalised wage setting, 
together with limited labour demand in the former homelands, has raised wages 
above what would otherwise be a restrictively low market clearing level – even if 
wages remain far lower than in the rest of the country where labour demand is higher. 
The apartheid geographic split continues to operate in the labour market. While 
people can now move relatively easily into other labour markets with higher demand 
for their work, firms do not necessarily relocate to areas where labour surpluses exist. 
Despite the abolition of restrictions on human movement, separate development still 
manifests through a low labour demand and poor agglomeration in the former 
homelands regions. This follows historically low infrastructure investment and the 
failure of decentralised industrialisation (Lowenberg, 1997). Political institutions can 
therefore linger beyond their expiration if they result in structural economic 
differences that persist. A ‘break’ in agglomeration during colonial times and the 
apartheid period now continues as a dispersion force in the former homelands. 
 
While separate development has contributed to large spatial inequality in current-day 
South Africa, historical evidence suggests that relative prosperity existed in the 
regions that were to become homelands. In a counterfactual world, therefore, had 
institutional hindrances not taken their course, it is likely that agglomeration may 
have emerged in these regions, leading to their industrialisation. For instance, black 
African peasant farmers successfully participated in commercial activities and 
exported produce beyond colonial borders (Bundy, 1979). Prior to 20th century 
restrictions on land ownership, black African agriculture provided a viable livelihood 
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for this population group. Before the imposition of the 1913 Land Act, black African 
populations were already concentrated in the areas that would later formally become 
the homelands (see Figure 1, bottom left panel). Therefore, the spatial distribution of 
human settlement was determined by decisions and migrations that occurred before 
cross-cutting segregation laws were formalised by the Union government, and also 
before forced resettlement occurred (Abel, 2016). Restrictions on ownership and 
movement that followed, however, did not allow populations to move in response to 
later regional economic changes. The result is, therefore, that the spatial distribution 
of people may have matched favourable agricultural conditions for black Africans in 
the early 20th century; this spatial pattern was ‘fixed’ by limitations on ownership 
and movement. As the economy diversified away from agriculture, and colonial 
authorities forced African participation in wage labour through hut and poll taxes 
(Redding, 2000), living in locations away from emerging centres placed black 
Africans at a severe economic disadvantage. These areas could – in all probability 
would – have followed agglomeration trajectories; however, institutional limitations 
prevented this process. 
 
An exploration of early settlement patterns is therefore necessary to understand 
forward linkages to later outcomes. Hannaford et al. (2014) critically evaluate a large 
literature on state formation and the movement of Bantu populations in southern 
Africa. A popular argument posits that climate variability was pivotally associated 
with social and political upheaval; in particular, the mfecane is a collection of 
conflicts that resulted in the dispersion of the black African Bantu-speaking people 
groups across the region up until 1890. While Hannaford et al. (2014) dispute the 
veracity of the causal links between climate and peoples’ settlement choices during 
this period, it nevertheless remains a compelling argument that drought was a 
determining factor. Modern studies that explore the link between climate and conflict 
enjoy the benefit of widely available data sources. The causal relationship has been 
clearly established by multiple authors (Burke, Hsiang & Miguel, 2015), lending 
credence to earlier arguments that the mfecane may have been causally attributed to 
climate instability.   
 
The combination of conflict and climate shocks critically have bearing for locational 
decisions. Figure 1 shows that – apart from large urban centres – the 1911 population 
was concentrated in areas where rainfall (the average between 1900 and 1913) was 
particularly high and the terrain was rugged. On the first count, it suggests that  
populations settled in areas which supported successful peasant agriculture (Bundy, 
1979). Terrain ruggedness, however, is known to be detrimental for economic 
prosperity in a global perspective. African populations, on the other hand, were 
shielded in the long run by this ‘poor’ geography, particularly because of its link with 
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the slave trade; slave raids were prevented in rough terrain, so that exploitation was 
limited in these regions (Nunn & Puga, 2012). Similarly, one might argue, rugged 
areas were beneficial for the escape from conflict associated with the mfecane in 
southern Africa (von Fintel & Fourie, 2018). The added benefit of high rainfall made 
this an appropriate place of settlement for the promotion of agriculture in safety. 
While these conditions were favourable in the beginning of the 20th century, the 
structural transformation away from agriculture, the cessation of tribal conflict, the 
advent of the migrant labour system and influx controls meant that an initially 
favourable spatial equilibrium converted into large and enduring spatial inequalities. 
This is particularly true because people were forced to remain in these regions, but 
industry did not follow the same pattern. 
 
The rest of this paper will weigh up the respective contributions of limiting residence 
to regions that became increasingly isolated from the core economy (the direct effect) 
and the long-run impact on local labour demand (the indirect effect) on modern day 
spatial earnings inequality. 
 
3 Methods and data 
 
This paper decomposes one measure of labour market earnings inequality – the 
variance of log earnings  – into various effects, including historical and geographic 
factors (climate shocks, initial settlement patterns and ruggedness) and modern local 
labour market conditions (which may also be influenced by past institutions). Labour 
market earnings constitute the bulk of total income inequality in South Africa 
(Leibbrandt, Woolard & Woolard, 2009). If individual earnings are determined by: 
 
log(𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛼
′𝑥𝑖𝑟𝑡 + 𝜇𝑟 + 𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑡  (1) 
 
where i indexes individuals, t indexes time, and r represents various regions; 𝑥𝑖𝑟𝑡 is 
a vector of ‘standard’ covariates that determines earnings in the modern labour 
market (such as education, age, race and gender), and  𝜇𝑟 is a regional  fixed effect 
that can be further decomposed as: 
 
𝜇𝑟 = 𝜙𝑟 + 𝛾𝑟
′ℎ𝑟 + 𝛿𝑟
′ 𝑚𝑟 + 𝜀𝑟 (2) 
 
where  ℎ𝑟 is a vector of variables that determine historical settlement patterns before 
the formalisation of many pivotal separate development laws, and  𝑚𝑟 represents a 
vector of modern, region-specific, labour market outcomes that are directly 
influenced by agglomeration and dispersion effects (that are in turn influenced by  
segregation policies). I first estimate the Mincerian earnings equation (1) with 
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regional fixed effects. I then extract ?̂?𝑟 from this regression to model the second 
equation (2). Coefficients of this equation, 𝜙𝑟 , 𝛾𝑟 and 𝛿𝑟, vary by region: I implement 
geographically weighted regressions (Fotheringham, Brunsdon & Charlton, 2002),  
allowing the estimated relationships to be heterogeneous over space. For instance, 
separate development has led to clear differences in wages across homeland borders. 
These can potentially be attributed to geographically heterogeneous effects of 
historical settlement patterns that are no longer favourable in an evolving economy.  
 
 
Figure 1: Spatial Distribution of terrain ruggedness, pre-1913 rainfall, 1911 
population and wages in early 2000s 
 
Typically a spatial regression discontinuity design is suitable to model distinct border 
effects which we may expect to find for the former homelands (Dell, 2010; 
Magruder, 2012). Alternatively, one could match and compare spatially contiguous 
regions on either side of the border. These tools, however, entail working with small 
regions close to the homelands only, and do not allow for a decomposition of 
country-wide spatial inequality. Instead, geographically weighted regression 
produces separate coefficient estimates and residuals for all districts and are also 
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adept at detecting spatial breaks (Fotheringham, Brunsdon & Charlton, 2002). They 
depend on a set of local models that cover the entire country, whether they are near 
the homelands or not. The approach also accounts for spatial autocorrelation. I can 
therefore quantify the effect that occurs when rich (poor) regions interact with other 
proximate rich (poor) regions to re-inforce inequality. The same functional form for  
𝜇𝑟 is estimated on a set of surrounding districts that fall within an optimal distance 
bandwidth. Hence, the intercept 𝜙𝑟 in each region functions as a fixed effect, and 
provides a depiction of how average wages vary across space once conditioning on 
other covariates. The bandwidth for the spatially local regressions is chosen by leave-
one-out cross validation. Controls are sequentially introduced to monitor cross-
district variation in wages that remains after stripping out the effects of ℎ𝑟 and 𝑚𝑟 
respectively. At each stage a decomposition is done, making use of the following 
identity: 
 
𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 =  𝑉𝑎𝑟(log(𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠)) 
                                      = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝑟)   
                                      = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝑟 + ?̂?𝑟
′ℎ𝑟 + ?̂?𝑟
′ 𝑚𝑟) + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀?̂?) (3) 
 
Reductions in spatial inequality attributable to control variables is represented as the 
ratio 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝑟)−𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝑟)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝑟)
, which is essentially the 𝑅2 of that regression. I also place this 
in broader context, by comparing changes in relation to total (a-spatial) inequality - 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(log(𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑡)) - and inequality that strips out individual-specific 
covariates.  
 
To conduct the proposed analysis, and especially to recover the regional fixed effects 
for the second stage, microdata over time is required. The reason for this is that some 
of the elements in 𝑥𝑖𝑟𝑡 are measured at the regional. A further necessary criteria is 
that a region with the same geographic definition should be followed throughout the 
cross sections. Labour Force Surveys from September 2000 to March 2004 meet 
these criteria (Magruder, 2012). They are enumerated twice annually, and contain 
indicators of magisterial districts, an administrative division that is associated with 
South Africa’s local courts (see Figure 1, where they are sketched).  Labour market 
earnings are enumerated in brackets, and I take the midpoint. I also construct local 
unemployment and unionisation rates from this data to construct the vector 𝑚𝑟. The 
set of controls 𝑥𝑖𝑟𝑡, includes standard Mincerian variables (quadratics in age and 
education), race, gender and regional skills and sector composition of jobs.  
 
I construct ℎ𝑟 from various historical and geographic sources. Historical population 
densities were transcribed from the district-level records of the 1911 census (Union 
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of South Africa, 1912). Terrain ruggedness is sourced from the data appendix of 
Nunn and Puga (2012). Grid cells are aggregated to match the magisterial districts. 
Rainfall grids – both for the periods corresponding to the Labour Force Survey, and 
the average of 1900-1913 records – are obtained from the reconstructions by 
Willmott and Matsuura (2015). In particular, I analyse rainfall shocks rather than 
levels. That is, the variables are expressed as a deviation from their long-run trend in 
millimetres. 
 
4 Results 
 
4.1 Global regressions 
 
Tables 1 and 2 show estimates from Ordinary Least Squares models, with samples 
differentiated by former homeland status. Estimates rely on the assumption of 
parameter homogeneity across space within the specified sample. The dependent 
variable is constructed from the regional fixed effects of Mincerian equation (1)1. 
These results illustrate the ‘average’ effects of various modern and historical factors 
on regional wages.  
 
Baseline estimates in columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 show that significant gender 
discrimination exists outside the former homeland borders. Returns to education are 
substantially higher within the former homelands. Of greatest interest, however, is 
that the intercept remains lower in the former homelands regions, even after 
introducing these controls. Differencing the intercepts across specifications indicates 
that average wages are more than double outside the former homelands than inside 
them.  This penalty represents a large contribution to spatial inequality that requires 
explanation. 
 
Controlling for early 21st century local labour market conditions in columns 3 and 4 
reverses this pattern. In a counterfactual world where local unemployment and 
unionisation rates would be equal across the region types, wages would be 
approximately 25% higher in the homelands compared to the rest of the country. 
These two variables represent the benefits of agglomeration in urbanised regions (or 
the lack of agglomeration in the former homelands): higher labour demand and better 
organisation of workers. The analysis confirms that low labour demand in the 
homelands drives wages down (Kingdon & Knight, 2006). If labour demand were 
not as depressed in the former homelands as it currently is, prevailing conditions 
would allow wages to grow significantly. The reversal represented by these results 
                                                        
1 These results are available on request. 
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indicate a missed opportunity: the homelands could have been high-paying regions 
had ‘natural’ agglomeration forces not been quenched by separate development and 
historically poor infrastructure development.  
 
Table 1 Global model 
Dependent: 
 𝜇𝑟 = log (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒) 
1 2 3 4 
Sample is in former homelands N Y N Y 
Average education in district 0,079 0,136 0,065 0,083 
 (0,011)*** (0,023)*** (0,011)*** (0,022)*** 
Proportion of district female -1,779 -0,607 -0,769 0,163 
 (0,306)*** (0,573) (0,350)** (0,511) 
log(2000s unemployment rate)   -0,345 -0,069 
   (0,223) (0,236) 
2000s Unionisation rate   0,921 2,319 
   (0,153)*** (0,389)*** 
Constant 3,496 2,410 3,814 4,070 
 (0,191)*** (0,431)*** (0,171)*** (0,459)*** 
Difference in intercepts  
(Homelands disadvantage) 108,6% -25.6% 
N 224 91 224 91 
R2 0,339 0,389 0,436 0,607 
NOTES: *p<0,1  **p<0,05  ***p<0,01 
 
In specifications 5 and 6 in Table 2, I control only for historical and geo-physical 
variables. Foremost, initial population density (in 1911) is only positively 
significantly correlated with wages outside the former homelands; to the contrary, 
this is not the case inside these borders. This supports the notion that agglomeration 
effects only followed early settlement patterns in the more developed part of the 
economy; separate development, however, prevented the link between early market 
potential on the one hand, and subsequent wage and productivity growth on the other, 
in the marginalised homelands. Similarly, positive rainfall shocks prior to 1913 
(which also proxy for early settlement patterns) remain correlated with wages outside 
the former homelands; the effect is zero inside the homelands. Keeping all else 
constant, wages are lower in regions that experience positive contemporaneous 
rainfall shocks. The contrast between the effects of rainfall in various periods on 
modern wages emphasises structural change in the economy: initial reliance on 
agriculture meant that populations flocked towards regions with high rainfall; after 
industrialisation this settlement pattern persisted, even if today’s settlement patterns 
or industrial choices are not primarily driven by agro-climatic considerations. While 
I hypothesise that early settlement flocked towards rugged regions for the purposes 
of escaping conflict, wages today are lower in rugged homeland regions, in line with 
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more standard views on the effects of terrain. These coefficients shed light on 
different agglomeration patterns, but columns 5 and 6 cannot fully explain why 
wages in homelands regions are lower than in the rest of the country. Columns 7 and 
8, which control for both current labour market conditions and historical variables, 
again yield a small homelands premium. In summary, these results show that South 
Africa experienced a process of agglomeration that followed initial settlement 
patterns – except for the homelands regions. Local labour market conditions that 
resulted from this imbalanced development pattern increased spatial inequality. I 
hypothesise that had separate development not occurred, the densely settled former 
homelands may also have developed into industrialised regions, reducing spatial 
inequality somewhat. 
 
Table 2 Global model 
Dependent: 
 𝜇𝑟 = log (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒) 
5 6 7 8 
Sample is in former homelands N Y N Y 
Average education in district 0,058 0,112 0,036 0,067 
 (0,013)*** (0,022)*** (0,013)*** (0,020)*** 
Proportion of district female -1,913 -0,830 -0,806 -0,034 
 (0,280)*** (0,521) (0,300)*** (0,461) 
log(2000s unemployment rate)   -0,417 -0,107 
   (0,226)* (0,219) 
2000s Unionisation rate   1,046 2,127 
   (0,144)*** (0,344)*** 
log(Terrain ruggedness) -0,003 -0,090 0,004 -0,085 
 (0,020) (0,032)*** (0,019) (0,028)*** 
Current rainfall deviation (mm) -0,250 -0,382 -0,233 -0,288 
 (0,085)*** (0,112)*** (0,077)*** (0,089)*** 
1900-1913 rainfall deviation (mm) 0,582 0,085 0,903 0,482 
 (0,342)* (0,489) (0,290)*** (0,346) 
log(1911 population) 0,027 -0,002 0,030 0,008 
 (0,015)* (0,022) (0,014)** (0,019) 
Constant 3,630 2,747 4,028 4,164 
 (0,186)*** (0,394)*** (0,160)*** (0,427)*** 
Difference in intercepts  
(Homelands disadvantage) 88,3% -13,6% 
N 224 91 224 91 
R2 0,406 0,536 0,528 0,712 
NOTES: *p<0,1  **p<0,05  ***p<0,01 
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4.2 Local regressions 
 
‘Global’ results mask local heterogeneity and spatial autocorrelation. Figures 2 
therefore disaggregates these results by location, using local models with similar 
specifications to those in Tables 1 and 2.  I limit myself to analysing mean wages (or 
the intercept), conditional on various covariates.2  The top left panel of Figure 2 
reflects the patterns found in the global model. Workers in urban centres (Gauteng in 
the North and Cape Town in the South) earn the highest wages, while lower wages 
are concentrated in outlying areas – especially in the former homelands. Most 
notably, the former Transkei along the south east coast is the poorest earning local 
labour market in the early 21st century.  
 
The top right panel conditions on contemporary local unemployment and 
unionisation rates.  Would the pressure of low labour demand be removed, the 
Transkei would be classified as one of the highest earning regions in the country. 
This reflects the estimates of Kingdon and Knight (2006), who conclude that the 
homelands are high wage regions once controlling for their poor labour demand.  A 
similar pattern emerges if I only control for historical and geographical conditions 
(as in specifications 5 and 6 of Table 2). Historical patterns therefore exert similar 
influence on the spatial wage structure as do modern local labour market conditions. 
I conjecture that they represent similar effects. Both sets of variables capture patterns 
of agglomeration: historical and geographic variables capture ‘initial’ conditions; 
local labour market variables represent the resulting agglomeration that followed 
these patterns, together with the dispersion effects caused by institutional failure in 
the apartheid homelands. Results from local regressions therefore support patterns 
identified in the global regressions; had separate development not prevented 
agglomeration, the former homelands could (all else being constant) have been high 
paying labour markets. 
 
                                                        
2 All intercepts have sufficiently large T-values to be considered statistically significant. Results for other 
coefficients follow similar signs to those in the global regressions, but are only significant in the most and 
least populated regions in 1911.  
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Figure 2: Conditional mean wages from various geographically weighted 
models 
 
4.3 Decomposition of spatial inequality  
 
I now turn to decomposing the contributors that explain (spatial) earnings inequality. 
Table 3 presents the proportion of the variance of log earnings (or spatial inequality) 
that is explained by various modelling strategies. These figures are presented relative 
to various benchmarks. Firstly, we analyse the contributors to individual inequality 
noticed in the raw data, as shown in column 1.1 Standard Mincerian, demographic 
and labour market composition controls (as outlined in section 3) explain more than 
half of wage inequality across individuals. Staying with a global model, estimates of 
inter-regional variation in inequality (𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?)) are about 95% of the size of variation 
of individual earnings (𝑉𝑎𝑟[log (𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠)]). Spatial variation in earnings is 
therefore a strong reflection of individual wage inequality. Estimating this same 
quantity with a local geographically weighted model including only a constant, raises 
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this figure to 97.95%. The improvement in fit results from smoothing within the 
bandwidth, which accounts for spatial autocorrelation.3 
 
Table 3 Spatial inequality decomposition 
 
  % of variation explained relative to: 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Model type Controlling for 
Individuals 
 
Regions 
 
Regions 
 
Global Micro controls 53,55%   
 
All within-region variation 
(=inter-regional spatial inequality) 
95,38%   
Local Spatial autocorrelation 97,95% 55,59%  
 
   + contemporary labour market 99,30% 84,86% 65,91% 
    + history and geography 98,51% 67,70% 27,27% 
         + all regional controls 99,46% 88,24% 73,51% 
NOTES: Column (1) refers to individuals in the raw data, column (2) refers to regions before controlling for 
spatial autocorrelation, column (3) refers to regions after controlling for spatial autocorrelation 
 
Given the high proportion of individual variance already explained by between-
region inequality, I now focus on explaining only the spatial, cross-regional element. 
Column 2 explains inequality relative to 𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?) obtained from a global model that 
does not adjust for spatial autocorrelation. Moving from the global to a local model 
(without adding controls, as in the top left panel of Figure 2) accounts for spatial 
autocorrelation in the error terms. This explains approximately 56% of spatial 
inequality. Local spill-over effects and interconnectedness of adjacent regions re-
inforce inequality, as wealthier regions tend to interact with wealthier regions, and 
poorer with poorer.  
 
In column 3 the departure point is inequality that already accounts for spatial 
autocorrelation. Off this basis, an additional 66% of inequality can be explained by 
contemporary local labour market conditions. These effects represent agglomeration. 
Historical and geographic controls account for less than half of spatial inequality 
compared to modern labour market variables. While history plays a role in explaining 
spatial inequality, its direct effect is smaller than indirect channels through which it 
also operates.  
 
 
                                                        
3 I use a cross-validated bandwidth. Other methods of bandwidth selection are more suitable to solve spatial 
autocorrelation problems (Cho, Lambert & Chen, 2010). However, the change in fit noted here can only be 
attributed to accounting for spatial autocorrelation, as no covariates are included in this part of the analysis. 
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5 Conclusions 
 
South Africa has battled with persistently high inequality for centuries, despite 
becoming the most developed economy on the African continent in modern times 
(Fourie & von Fintel, 2010, 2011; Leibbrandt, Woolard & Woolard, 2009). This 
pattern not only defies the Kuznets (1955) hypothesis, but also the predictions of 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2002) who posit that democratisation is an impetus for 
greater equality. Contrary to this proposition, inequality has grown in the democratic 
era. Overall inequality is mirrored closely by the spatial distinctions introduced by 
separate development legislation in South Africa. My estimates show that this 
overlap is strong. Former apartheid homelands, which are located in the regions 
reserved for black African land ownership by the 1913 Land Act, remain low wage 
regions with sluggish labour demand; despite the removal of influx controls and rapid 
increases in migration flows, spatial imbalances have not averted after 
democratisation.  
 
This paper shows that about half of earnings differences across local labour markets 
can be explained by positive spatial autocorrelation. It emphasises the strong 
localisation of labour market earnings: better-paying regions are clustered in areas 
adjacent to other better-paying districts; poverty in one region reinforces the poverty 
experienced by neighbours. This strong spatial concentration and polarization is the 
product of separate development. A large part of inequality that is not explained by 
this pattern can be attributed to historical settlement patterns, geography and climate 
shocks. Initial conditions continued, as economic activity agglomerated around 
existing market potential, except in the former apartheid homelands. Initial 
settlement before the formalisation of separate development (measured in 1911) is 
strongly correlated with positive rainfall shocks and terrain ruggedness. It supports a 
hypothesis that black Africans flocked to regions that favoured cultivation and were 
shielded from conflicts induced by the mfecane. The rise of peasant farming in this 
period suggests that this was a successful settlement strategy. However, this pattern 
became detrimental in the long run, as the 1913 Land Act and subsequent separate 
development legislation locked populations into these areas that were separate from 
the economic core. Under-investments in infrastructure by colonial and apartheid-era 
governments represent an institutional failure that prevented agglomeration in these 
regions. As a consequence of geographic isolation from urban labour markets and a 
changing economy which moved away from agriculture, labour demand remained 
too low to yield living wages to most of the population in former homelands. Hence, 
current local labour market conditions explain a large proportion of earnings 
inequality, even after the dissolution of formal separate development. While people 
may relocate to more favourable local labour markets, firms have not moved to areas 
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that remain geographically isolated. The result is that despite formal changes in 
institutions and large migration of people, former economic inequalities have 
remained intact. 
 
New economic geography theories explain why spatial inequalities arise and grow. 
This paper has shown that agglomeration effects could potentially have manifested 
in former apartheid homelands had institutional barriers not prevented the normal 
course. Historically, therefore, firms did not locate to the former homelands. While 
market potential still remains high due to dense settlement, external economies of 
scale remain absent. New firms are also unlikely to establish operations close to the 
former homelands, so that spatial inequalities may continue into the future. Failed 
industrial decentralisation during the apartheid period bears testament to the 
difficulties in remedying existing spatial inequalities. South Africa therefore faces a 
unique situation in which densely populated areas have not grown into industrialised 
local economies. Solutions to spatial inequality may therefore not rely on standard 
economic forces.  
 
In the democratic era, the welfare of residents in former homelands has improved 
due to the expansion of government cash transfers (Pienaar & von Fintel, 2014). The 
amounts of these government grants are, however, too low to bridge spatial 
imbalances across regions. Together with continued low labour demand in rural 
homeland areas, and relatively high unemployment in urban areas, it is furthermore 
unlikely that urbanisation can alleviate spatial inequality. Hence, I argue that despite 
the removal of formal separate development policies, their economic legacy 
perpetuates the spatial inequalities that they were originally designed to create.  
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